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This paper first gives an explanation of the behaviour which motivates individuals to 
engage in the shadow economy. It will be shown that people who fear being caught by tax 
authorities will be less likely to work in the shadow economy and those who earn more 
money in the ‘official’ economy will also work less in the shadow economy. The result of 
a logistic regression shows that if others a re seen to be engaged in the shadow economy 
then this increases subsequent demand for such activities. It was found that on average, a 
shadow economy worker earned AUS$2135.31 during the year 2000, and households 
spent AUS$2,293.00 for these services.  Using micro-data to calculate an overall 
aggregate figure for the estimated size of the shadow economy in Australia during the 
year 2000, it was found that between 4.81% and 8.8% of the gross national income (GNI) 
was earned in the cash economy.   
JEL-classification: C23, C25, D12, A26. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As crime and other underground economic activities (including the shadow economy) are 
a fact of life around the world, most societies attempt to control these activities through 
various measures such as punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education. 
Gathering statistics about who is engaged in underground (or criminal) activities, the 
frequency with which these activities occur, and the magnitude of such activities, is 
crucial for making effective and efficient decisions regarding the allocation of a country’s 
resources.  Given that the individuals who are engaged in these activities do not want to 
be identified, it is very difficult to get accurate information about these  underground 
activities. Hence, the estimation of shadow economy activities can be considered a 
scientific passion for knowing the unknown. Moreover, little is known about what 
motivates individuals to work in the shadow economy or request such work.   
 
Although quite a large amount of literature
1 has been published on single aspects of the 
hidden economy, and a comprehensive survey has been written by Schneider and Enste, 
the subject is still quite controversial
2. There are disagreements about the definition of 
what constitutes a shadow economic activity, there are disagreements about the estimation 
procedures used to estimate the size of the shadow economy and there is also 
disagreement of the use of these estimates in economic analysis and policy aspects.
3  
 
There appears to be strong indications that the shadow economy is increasing around the 
world. The size, the causes and the consequences of this increase are different for different 
countries, but there are some comparisons which can be made between them that might be 
of interest to social scientists, the public in general, and also might be helpful to 
politicians who need to deal with this phenomenon.  There are several important reasons 
                                                 
1 The literature about the “shadow“, “underground“, “informal“, “second“, “cash” or “parallel“, economy is strongly 
increasing. Various topics on how to measure it, its causes and its effect on the official economy are analysed. See for 
example, the first publications by Tanzi (1982); Frey and Pommerehne (1984), and Feige (1989), survey type 
publications by Thomas (1992), Loayza (1996), Pozo (1996), Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 
1997, 1998a), Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997), and Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a); and for 
an overall survey of the global evidence of its size Schneider and Enste (2000). 
2 Compare e.g. in the Economic Journal, vol. 109, nr. 456, June 1999 the feature “controversy: on the hidden 
economy”. 
3 Compare the opinions of Tanzi (1999), Thomas (1999) and Giles (1999). 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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why politicians and public sector officials should be especially w orried about the size and 
growth of the shadow economy. Amongst the most important of these are: 
 
(1) If an increase in the shadow economy is caused mainly by a rise in the overall tax 
and social security burden, then this may lead to an erosion of the tax and social 
security bases and finally to a decrease in tax receipts. This will subsequently lead 
to a further increase in the budget deficit or to a further increase of tax rates with 
the consequence of an additional increase in the shadow economy and so on. 
Therefore an increase in the shadow economy can be seen as a reaction by 
individuals who feel overburdened by state activities. 
 
(2) As the shadow economy increases, economic policy will be based on erroneous 
“official” indicators (e.g., unemployment, official labour force, income, 
consumption), or at least indicators that are “inaccurate” in their magnitude. In 
such a situation a prospering shadow economy may lead to severe difficulties for 
politicians because it “causes” or “provides” unreliable official indicators, and the 
direction of the intended policy measures may therefore be questionable. 
 
(3) While an increase in the shadow economy provides strong incentives to domestic 
and foreign workers and draws resources away from the official economy, it 
should be mentioned that two-thirds  of the income earned in the shadow economy 
is subsequently returned to the official economy
4 (e.g., retail spending) resulting in 
a considerable positive effect on the official economy. 
 
These concerns and the scientific fascination of the underground economy has inspired us 
to tackle this difficult question and undertake the challenging task of providing some 
empirical knowledge and insights about why people work in the shadow economy or why 
people request such work. 
 
                                                 
4 This figure has been derived from polls of the German and Austrian population about the effects of the shadow 
economy. For further information see Schneider (1998b). Moreover the results of these polls show that two-thirds of 
the value added produced in the shadow economy would not be in the official economy if the shadow economy did not 
exist. 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Section 2 presents some basic findings of a survey which asked 7004 Australian 
households about their tax paying behaviour, whether they evade their taxes, and whether 
they work in the cash economy or request such work. Section 3 presents some preliminary 
findings about the factors which might motivate individuals to work (or request work) in 
the shadow economy. Finally, section 4 provides a summary of the major empirical 
findings and the conclusions that can be made from these findings. 
 
 
2.  Some Basic Findings of the Survey with respect to 
individual attitudes of the cash/shadow economy. 
 
In May 2000, the “Community, Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey” (V. Braithwaite, ANU) 
was sent to 7004 Australian households. In this survey respondents were asked a broad 
range of questions about their experiences with the Australian Taxation Office, their tax 
paying behaviour, their cash transaction behaviour, their goals for an Australian society, 
and whether they believe the tax office acts in accordance with the standards set out in the 
Taxpayers’ Charter.
5 A response rate of 29% was achieved, with 2040 households 
returning a completed questionnaire. Of the 2040 respondents, 118 persons (households) 
admitted that they had received cash-in-hand payments in the last 12 months, suggesting 
that 6.0% of the investigated households work in the shadow economy. In addition, 283 
(or 14.4%) of the respondents said that they demanded shadow economy work (paid cash-
in-hand in the last 12 months) and 29 persons (1.4%) said that they worked regularly i n 
the shadow economy and hired shadow economy workers.
6  
 
Table 1 presents the income earned in the shadow economy, the money spent on shadow 
economy activities and the “official” income situation for shadow economy workers and 
those who demand shadow economy work. On average, shadow economy workers earned 
AUS$2135.31 per year which is 8.82% in terms of their official income. Of the 
                                                 
5 In this paper we will only present the empirical finds with respect to cash/shadow economy attitudes; for other 
findings compare Braithwaite (2001). 
6 These figures of shadow economy activities are quite low compared to European results; e.g. in a survey in Germany 
24% of all respondents worked in the shadow economy and 42.5% hired shadow economy workers (Compare 
Schneider (1999)). 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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households that demanded shadow economy work, an average of AUS$2,293.5 was spent 
annually, which is 5.85% of their “official” income. The average hourly wage earned by a 
shadow economy worker was reported to be AUS$23.29, while the average amount of 
money spent for this work was reported to be AUS$48.25 per hour.  While unlikely, it 
appears that those demanding shadow economy work spend 107% more per hour than a 
shadow economy worker earns. Table 1 also shows that shadow economy workers have 
considerably lower incomes than those who demand shadow economy activities, with the 
average “official” income of a shadow economy worker being 61.7% of the average 
“official” income of a person who demands shadow economy work. 
 
The services provided by shadow economy workers and the services requested by those 
who demand shadow economy work are shown in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. Not only 
do both tables show great differences in the average amount of income earned in the 
various jobs and the average amount of money spent in the various work areas, but also 
there are great differences in the frequencies of the different work/job fields. Shadow 
economy workers are mostly engaged to do “repair work in the house and garden” and 
also in the area of “teaching, training and entertainment”, whereas shadow economy work 
is mostly demanded in the sectors of “repair in the house and garden”, “service outside the 
house” and “garden work”. Both Tables 2 and 3 show that on average the highest income 
earned per year is in the “car delivery service sector”, with AUS$6,089.80 being earned 
by a shadow economy worker and AUS$7,498.67 being spent for this service.  However, 
the results in both tables differ: Shadow economy workers in the area of “service outside 
the house” earn on average AUS$2,370.91 per year, while demanders of this work spend 
AUS$5,370.42 on average.  This finding suggests that those who work in this area fail to 
declare the majority of their earnings.  In the area of “teaching, training and 
entertainment”, demanders spend on average AUS$516.66 per year, whereas workers in 
the same area earn AUS$2,381.00.  Besides car delivery services, shadow economy 
workers earn most in the area of “repair in house and garden” with an average of 
AUS$3,226.11 being earned per year.  The least amount is earned in the area of “farm and 
other services” with an average of AUS$500.00 per year. 
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Table 4 presents results which investigated whether households that are engaged in the 
shadow economy have different attitudes to those who are not engaged in the shadow 
economy.  These attitudes were assessed by the following two questions: 
 
(1) “Imagine yourself in this situation: You have been paid $5000 in cash for work 
that you have done outside your regular job. You don’t declare it on your income 
tax return. What do you think the chances are that you will get caught?” 
 
(2) Why do you think people work for cash-in hand payments? By cash-in-hand 
payments we mean cash money that tax is not paid on.”  
 
When examining the results to question 1, it can be clearly seen that people (both 
suppliers and demanders) engaged in shadow economy activities think that their chances 
of getting caught are considerably lower compared to the other respondents. For example, 
33.0% of shadow economy suppliers and 32.9% of those who demand shadow economy 
work, think the ‘chance of getting caught is about 0%’ compared to 15.6% of non-shadow 
economy workers a nd 13.9% of non-shadow economy demanders. Only 9.6% of shadow 
economy suppliers and 8.4% of those who demand shadow economy work, think the 
‘chance of getting caught is about 100%’, in contrast to 20.3% of non-shadow economy 
workers and 21.5% of non-shadow economy demanders. 
 
Turning to question 2 responses, one explanation given by survey respondents as to why 
they thought people work for cash-in-hand payments is that income taxes are too high.  
Systematic differences between people engaged in the shadow e conomy and those who 
are not were also found.  However, the differences were not as clear-cut as the differences 
found for question 1. Results showed that 37.7% of the shadow economy workers 
(suppliers) and 23.4% of those who demand shadow economy work (demanders) think 
that people are engaged in the shadow economy because income taxes are too high versus 
19.4% of non-shadow economy workers and 19.8% of non-shadow economy demanders. 
 
In Tables 5 to 7, the findings of other important attitudinal and socio-demographic 
variables are shown.  Table 5 presents the findings from those people who are engaged in 
shadow economy work and clearly shows that, on average, cash economy workers have 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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considerably lower ‘official’ incomes than those people not working in the  shadow 
economy (mean difference is AUS$4,100 or 85% of a non-cash economy worker’s 
income).  However, this may be explained by the fact that shadow economy workers are 
considerably younger than non-shadow economy workers (average age is 38.3 years 
versus 48.6 years respectively), with an average of 10.4 years separating them.   
 
Not surprisingly, shadow economy workers have had significantly more contact (roughly 
10% more than the others) and conflict with the ATO.  In addition, compared to non-
shadow economy workers, shadow economy workers think that they and other shadow 
economy workers should be much less honest in declaring cash earnings.  A similar result 
was found when measuring the attitude: “It is smart to work in the shadow economy”.  
Shadow economy workers expressed this attitude more strongly than non-shadow 
economy workers.  Further, in contrast to non-shadow economy workers, shadow 
economy workers disapprove much less of others working in the shadow economy.  
Interestingly, those involved in the  cash economy are also more likely to have a “smart” 
tax agent.  A smart tax agent is one who is creative and seeks out tax loopholes and the 
grey areas of tax, etc.  Thus, in more ways than one, these people seek to reduce their tax 
obligations. 
 
Table 6 p resents the results for those who demand shadow economy activities compared 
to those that do not.  It can be seen that results of these two groups are very similar.  When 
examining the age variable, it can be seen that there is no significant difference between 
those who demand shadow economy work and those that do not (48.45 years versus 47.82 
years respectively).  Interestingly, there was no difference between the two groups when 
answering the attitude question “I should honestly declare cash earnings”.  This is in 
contrast to the finding for the shadow economy suppliers (see Table 5).  There was also no 
difference between people demanding shadow economy work and those who do not in 
relation to the variable “has a smart tax agent”.  One difference that was found between 
these two groups of people was that those people who demand shadow economy work had 
considerably higher incomes than those who do not demand shadow economy work (on 
average 50.6% higher).   
 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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In general, the results demonstrate that there are significant differences between the 
attitudes of people engaged in the shadow economy and those who are not.  The next 




3.  A Preliminary explanation of the factors which motivate 
individuals to work in the Shadow (cash) Economy. 
 
For an individual to be engaged in shadow economy activities (either on the demand or 
supply side), several factors play a role.  Below, a number of variables have been 
hypothesized to play a role in influencing people to become involved in the cash 
economy.  They are: 
 
1)  The income situation.  Ceteris paribus, it would be expected that as income 
increased, people would demand and supply  less shadow economy activities; 
hence a negative correlation would be expected.  However, it could be the case that 
shadow economy suppliers compare their income situation with their neighbours, 
want to have a better life, and hence  increase their shadow economy activities.  
Thus a positive correlation would also seem plausible if this were the case.  
 
2)  People engaged in shadow economy activities know that if they are caught by the 
tax authorities they will be punished; hence people who feel that the likelihood of 
being detected is high will be  less likely t o be engaged in shadow economy 
activities, ceteris paribus. 
 
3)  If people feel a high moral obligation to pay their taxes, they will be  less likely to 
be engaged in shadow economy activities, ceteris paribus. 
 
4)  If people feel overburdened by state activities ( e.g., high income tax) they will be 
more likely to be engaged in shadow economy activities, ceteris paribus. 
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5)  Those people who need more disposable income for use on a special situation (e.g., 
construction of a house, second holiday, etc) will be  more likely to be engaged in 
shadow economy activities, ceteris paribus. 
 
6)  Those people who are in conflict with the ATO are  more likely to be engaged in 
shadow economy activities, ceteris paribus.  The same holds for those who have a 
lot of contacts with the ATO. 
 
7)  Those people who feel they should honestly declare all cash earnings, will be  less 
likely to be engaged in shadow economy activities, ceteris paribus.  Also, those 
people who feel that all other people should honestly declare all shadow economy 
activities will be less likely to be engaged in shadow economy activities. 
 
8)  Those who think that people engaged in shadow economy activities are smart will 
be  more likely to be engaged in shadow economy activities themselves, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
9)  Those people who disapprove of others working in the shadow economy will be 
less likely to be engaged in the shadow economy activities. 
 
While the variables presented in points 1 to 9 above have been specifically proposed, 
other factors such as education, occupation, gender, marital status, and number of children 
may also predict whether people become involved in the shadow economy.  
 
Table 8 presents the results of a logistic regression. With the help of this regression an 
attempt is made to explain the decision of individual b e engaged in the shadow economy 
or not. The dependent variables are as follows: 
 
0  work/supply shadow economy activities (n=76) 
1  do not work/supply shadow economy activities (n=1150) 
and 
0  demand shadow economy activities (n=197) 
1  do not demand shadow economy activities (n=1024) 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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The independent variables are the factors mentioned in hypotheses (1) to (9) in addition to 
some socio-demographic variables.  If we first turn to the overall explanatory validity of 
these two logistic regressions, we get a Nagelkerke R
2 =  0.289 for shadow economy 
demand and R
2 = 0.229 for shadow economy supply; i.e. 0.289 and 22.9 % of the variance 
of the dependant variable is explained, respectively. For those who work in the shadow 
economy (results for those who request work are in brackets) we can correctly predict 
14.7% (15.8%) of all cases; i.e., 12 versus 64 (29 versus 168).  For those who do not work 
in the shadow economy (request work) we can correctly explain 99.3% (98.9%), i.e., 1142 
versus 8 (1013 versus 11).  Overall, for shadow economy suppliers we can predict 94.1% 
of all cases correctly, and 85.3% for shadow economy demanders.  While these results are 
quite promising, the regressions have to be improved to raise the predictive role for the 
shadow economy workers (suppliers) and those who demand services.   
 
If we now turn to the independent variables and their relationship to the dependent 
variable of interest, some results are quite interesting in that they confirm most of the 
hypotheses provided earlier.  The variable “moral obligation to pay taxes” had no 
statistically significant influence on shadow economy supply or demand, whereas the 
variable “chances of getting caught” did have a statistically significant influence on 
shadow economy workers and those who demand shadow  economy work.  The results 
also show that the higher the perceived chance of getting caught, the less likely people 
will be engaged in the shadow economy, and the higher the income tax, the more likely it 
is that people will be engaged in shadow economy activities.  If people need more 
disposable income they will demand more shadow economy activities.  Having had 
conflict with the ATO or having had a lot of contact with the ATO had no influence on 
peoples’ motivation to be engaged in shadow economy activities.  In addition, whether 
people disapproved or not of others working in the shadow economy had no influence on 
whether they were engaged in shadow economy activity themselves.  Results also show 
that the more honest people are at declaring their cash earnings, the less likely they were 
to be engaged in shadow economy activities.  In addition, if people believed it was 
“smart” to work in the cash economy this increased their shadow economy activities.   
 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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An increase in income, ceteris paribus, appeared to r educe shadow economy supply (i.e., 
work in the shadow economy decreases), but increased the demand for shadow economy 
activities—a result not consistent with our income hypothesis.  The results also show that 
as people aged, they tended to work less in the shadow economy.  Education and 
occupation appeared to have no influence on shadow economy activities.  Men worked 
more in the shadow economy than women (statistically significant) but women demanded 
more shadow economy activities (statistically significant).  The number of children one 
had and whether one had to pay child support had no influence on shadow economy 
activities and people working for the government worked less in the shadow economy 
(statistically significant) and demanded less shadow economy  work compared to those 
working in the private sector. 
 
Table 9 attempts to explain which variables predict the amount of cash money earned in 
the shadow economy and Table 10 attempts to explain which variables predict the amount 
of cash money spent in the  shadow economy.  Only the official income variable and the 
variable “choose an honest accountant” were found to predict the amount of cashed 
earned in the shadow economy.  As predicted, the income variable was negatively 
correlated with the amount of cash  money earned in the shadow economy.  When all 
variables were entered into the regression analysis, the overall F -test was statistically 
significant,  F=2.69,  p <0.05.  However, only 18% (R
2 = 0.18) of the variation in amount 
of cash money earned could be explained by these variables together.   
 
Table 10 presents the results for the money spent for shadow economy activities.  
Unexpectedly, official income has a positive influence on the amount of money spent on 
shadow economy activities and this influence was significant.  The variable “taxes are too 
high  – I have income loss” significantly predicts the amount of money spent on shadow 
economy activities and influences in the direction expected (i.e., positive influence).  This 
suggests that the more money one loses through their tax burden, the more likely they are 
to work in the shadow economy.  Again, only 8% (R
2 = 0.08) of the variation (see Table 
10) in the amount of money spent in the shadow economy could be explained when all of 
the variables were entered into the regression ( F = 2.70,  p < 0.05).  Given that the overall 
fit is poor, both regressions need to be improved before any firm conclusions can be made 




4.  A Preliminary attempt to calculate aggregate figures of 
the Australian shadow economy 
 
Section 2 presented income figures of individuals who work in the shadow economy.  A 
preliminary attempt can be made to use these income figures to calculate an aggregated 
figure of the shadow economy income earned in Australia.  The procedure and results of 
this attempt are shown in Table 11 (part 1 and 2).  It should be noted that in order to 
estimate an aggregated figure of the shadow economy in Australia, a number of 
assumptions have to be made.  These assumptions include how many people are working 
in the shadow economy, how one treats the unemployed and how one treats those who 
retire early.  Consider the officially employed workforce first.  By grouping them using 
Australian Bureau of Statistics categories (labourers, managers, and administrators, etc), 
and then assuming that they are engaged in shadow economy work, an overall figure of 
AUS$17.563billion or 2.86% of GNI being earned through the shadow economy can be 
estimated.  However, this figure does not include the unemployed or those  who have 
retired early (55-65 years of age). 
 
By combining the unemployed and those who have retired early, there are 5,625,700 
people who could potentially work and earn in the shadow economy.  This poses a 
problem when trying to estimate how much these p eople can work and earn.  As these 
groups of people have much more time on their hands they have the ability to work more.  
Hence, an absolute minimum figure that they could earn is the same as the shadow 
economy income earned by those who are officially e mployed.  These two groups of 
people might also earn double or triple the amount of ‘cash’ income than the officially 
employed and these estimates are also presented in Table 11.  All three of these 
possibilities may be plausible.  Assuming that the unemployed and those who have retired 
early have the same shadow economy income as those who are officially employed, an 
aggregated figure of AUS$29.575billion (or 4.81% of official GNI) being earned in the 
shadow economy by these two groups can be obtained.  Assuming they earn double the 
cash income of those officially employed, an aggregate figure of AUS$41.588billion (or 
6.77% of official GNI) being earned in the shadow economy by these two groups can be 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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obtained.  Finally, assuming these two groups of people  earn triple the amount of cash 
income that those officially employed, we get an aggregate figure of AUS$53.601billion 
(or 8.75% of official GNI) being earned in the shadow economy.  To get an overall 
indication of how much is being earned in the Australian shadow economy, one should 
also add the amount of shadow economy income earned from small and medium sized 
enterprises to these aggregated figures.  An overall estimate of the shadow economy work 
being conducted in Australia was calculated using the currency demand approach (see 
Schneider & Enste, 2000) and it was found that the value is approximately 14.2% of GNI.  
While the aggregate results presented in this section seem plausible, it should be noted 
that the assumptions that were made could be criticised and hence the results should be 
accepted with caution.   
 
 
5.  Summary and Policy Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to provide an explanation of the individual behaviours which 
motivate people to engage in the cash economy.  For example, people who f ear being 
caught by tax authorities will be less likely to work in the shadow economy and those who 
earn more money also appear to work less in the shadow economy.  The results also show 
that if others are seen to be engaged in the shadow economy then this will subsequently 
increase the demand for such activities (i.e., “if everyone one else does it, I might as well 
do it too”).   
 
Overall, the results presented in this paper showed that a shadow economy worker 
earned, on average, AUS$2,135.31 in 2000 and h ouseholds spent AUS$2,293.00 for 
shadow economy activities in 2000. Results also showed that people engaged in 
shadow economy work are convinced that the probability of being caught is 
considerably lower than those not engaged in such activities. In addition, shadow 
economy workers believe more so that the tax burden is too high.  This variable 
appears to a strong predictor for why people become involved in the cash economy. 
Further, people who work in the cash economy are less honest when declaring their 
cash earnings and believe it is ‘smart’ to work in the cash economy.  These results can 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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also be confirmed empirically with a logistic regression analysis when using the 
dichotomous dependent variable (to be engaged (=0) or not engaged (=1) in the 
shadow economy). Finally, by using the data collected in the survey, an overall 
aggregate figure was calculated to estimate the degree of income earned in the cash 
economy in Australia for the year 2000.  It was estimated that between 4.81% and 
8.8% of Gross National Income (GNI) was earned through these illegal activities.  
Overall, it should be noted that this paper presents preliminary findings from the 
Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey and should only be seen as a first 
attempt at explaining the motivating factors responsible for why people engage in 
shadow economy activities.  
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Table 1:  Earned Income in the Shadow Economy, money spent for the shadow economy activities and the “official” income for both 








Workers in  
AUS$  
Hourly wage of 
Shadow Economy 
Workers in  
AUS-$ 
Money spent per 




Money spent per 
hour for Shadow 
Economy 





workers in  
AUS$ 
Annual “Official” 
income of those 
who demand 
Shadow Economy 
work in  
AUS$ 
Mean  2135.31  23.29  2293.50  48.25  24,200.00  39,217.20 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
461.23  2.75  697.05  4.14  1,643.00  2,079.20 
Median  500.00  15.00  500.00  30.00  20,000.00  35,000.00 
Minimum  70.00  3.00  15.00  1.00  0.0  0.0 
Maximum  30,000.00  200.00  150,000.00  450.00  100,000.00  250,000.00 
Sum  215,666.00  -  580,255.00  -  2,783,000.00  10,471,000.00 
Frequency 
(Sample Size) 
101  101  253  253  115  267 
Shadow Economy 
Activity in % of 
“official” income 
        8.82%  5.85% 
Source: own calculations. 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 2:  Services offered by shadow economy workers 
 
Service  Sample (N)  Annual income earned in the shadow economy 
AUS$ 
    Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
1). Repair of House and 
Garden 
18  3,226.11  7,140.23  70  30,000 
2). Garden work  7  582.14  649.15  100  2,000 
3). House Services  15  1,123.47  1,877.00  72  6,500 
4). Service outside house  11  2,370.91  3,035.34  80  10,000 
5). Car delivery services  5  6,089.80  9,634.35  400  23,000 
6). Teaching, Training 
and Entertainment 
20  2,381.00  5,190.63  100  22,000 
7). Farm and other 
Services 
3  500.00  435.89  200  1,000 
8). Miscellaneous  13  1,715.38  2,569.00  100  10,000 
Total  92  2,249.41  4,822.40  70  30,000 
 
Analysis of variance 
 
  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  Sig. 
Between Groups  1.43E+08  7  20398008.450  .868  .535 
Within Groups  1.97E+09  84  23493633.561     
Total  2.12E+09  91       4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
  20 
Table 3:  Services ordered by those who demand shadow economy work 
 
Work Area  Sample  
(N) 
Annual income spent in the shadow economy 
AUS$ 
    Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
1). Repair House and 
Garden 
84  1,648.0952  5,369.6141  20.00  48,000.00 
2). Garden work  48  3,692.2500  21,588.0467  15.00  15,0000.00 
3). House Services  67  1,874.2687  4,005.0296  20.00  30,800.00 
4). Service outside house  12  5,370.4167  15,188.2060  90.00  53,500.00 
5). Car delivery services  6  7,498.6667  13,847.9282  112.00  35,000.00 
6). Teaching, Training 
and Entertainment 
6  516.6667  304.4120  150.00  950.00 
7). Farm and other 
Services 
12  7,72.4167  1,685.4417  70.00  6,000.00 
8). Miscellaneous  13  1,067.3077  1,158.0670  25.00  4,000.00 
Total  248  2,326.3105  10,906.8184  15.00  15,0000.00 
 
Analysis of variance 
 
  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  Sig. 
Between Groups  4.83E+08  7  68976496.632  .573  .778 
Within Groups  2.89E+10  240  120416502.28     
Total  2.94E+10  247       
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Table 4:  Attitudes to Tax related questions of people engaged in Shadow Economy activities versus those who are not engaged in 
shadow economy activities 
 
Shadow Economy workers 
/suppliers 
Shadow Economy work 
demanders 
Shadow Economy workers/ 
suppliers 
Shadow Economy work 
demanders 
What do you 
think the 
Chances are 





















































































































































































d.f. =4      Sig: 0.000 
72.289 




d.f. = 4        Sig: 0.000 
9.56 
d.f. =4       Sig: 0.048 
 
Own Calculations. Explanations: 
1)  Question: Image yourself in this situation. You have been paid $5000 in cash for work that you have done outside your regular job. You don´t 
declare it on your income tax return. 
2)  Question: Why do you think people work for cash-in-hand payments? By cash-in-hand we mean cash money that tax is not paid on. 
3)  Figures in brackets represent the number of respondents. 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 5:  Significance test of continuous variables between shadow economy supply 






































































































































It is smart to 
























































1) t-test for equality of means; equal variances not assumed, further explanations see 
Table7. 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 6:  Significance test of continuous variables between shadow economy 






































































































































It is smart to 
























































1) t-test for equality of means; equal variances not assumed, further explanations see Table 
7. 
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In conflict with 
ATO (Australian Tax Office) 
 
1 = never in conflict        ￿          2 = once in conflict            ￿           3 = mostly in conflict 
 
Has had contact  
with ATO 
 
1 = little contact        ￿        2         ￿         3          ￿          4         ￿          5 = most contact 
 
I should honestly  
declare cash earnings 
 
1 = NO!      ￿       2 = no       ￿        3 = don’t know      ￿         4 = yes       ￿        5 = YES! 
 
Others should honestly 
declare cash earnings 
 
1 = NO!       ￿       2 = no       ￿      3 = don’t know        ￿        4 = yes       ￿        5 = YES! 
 
It is smart to work 
in the cash economy 
I think people working in the cash economy are smart 
1 = highly unlikely      ￿         2         ￿         3          ￿        4         ￿         5 = highly likely 
 
Disapproves of working 
in the cash economy 
I disapprove of people working in the shadow economy 
1 = highly unlikely      ￿         2        ￿         3          ￿         4         ￿         5 = highly likely 
 
Has a smart tax 
agent 
 
1 = strongly disagree  ￿  2 = disagree ￿ 3 = neither  ￿  4 = agree  ￿  5 = strongly agree 
 
 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 8:  Logistic Regression Results (Last category is indicator). People engaged in 
shadow economy activities                     Part 1 
 
Independent Variables  Estimated coefficients  
b value (Wald test) 






Moral obligation to pay tax 
1.  Strongly disagree 
2.  Disagree 
3.  Neither 
4.  Agree 
0.70 
 0.47  (0.23) 
 0.44  (0.53) 
 0.23  (0.18) 
 0.10  (0.09) 
1.62 
 0.90  (0.92) 
 0.11  (0.07) 
 0.34  (0.80) 
 0.04  (0.03) 
Chances to get caught 
1.  About zero % 
2.  About 25% 
3.  About 50% 
4.  About 75 % 
6.91 
-1.14  (4.21)* 
-0.51  (0.74) 
-0.45  (0.70) 
-0.28  (0.19) 
22.94** 
-1.43 (15.54)** 
-1.03  (7.45)** 
-0.52  (2.10) 
-0.88  (5.24)* 
Income tax too high 
1.  Definitely not 
2.  Unlikely 
3.  Unsure 
4.  Probably 
9.86* 
 7.45  (0.08) 
 0.32  (0.52) 
 0.37  (0.66) 
 1.02  (9.23)** 
5.32 
 1.45  (2.98) 
-0.19  (0.41) 
-0.09  (0.08) 
 0.16  (0.51) 
Want to have more disposable income  
5.  Definitely not 
6.  Unlikely 
7.  Unsure 
8.  Probably 
3.03 
-0.84  (0.51) 
 0.06  (0.01) 
 0.51  (0.53) 
-0.36  (1.37) 
5.92 
-1.13  (1.39) 
-0.07  (0.02) 
 1.04  (4.04)* 
 0.16  (0.74) 
In conflict with the ATO  
     1 = never in conflict   3 = mostly in 
conflict 
 0.09  (0.18)  -0.06  (0.24) 
Has had contact with the ATO 
     1 = little contact         3 = most contact 
-0.40  (2.19)  -0.08  (0.21) 
I should honestly declare cash earnings 
     1 = NO!!                     5 = YES!! 
 0.70  (9.05)**   0.08  (0.31) 
Others should honestly declare cash 
earnings 
     1 = NO!!                     5 = YES!! 
 0.48  (3.71)*   0.14  (0.88) 
It is smart to work in the cash economy 
     1 = highly unlikely     5 = highly likely 
-0.05  (0.08)  -0.44  
(11.92)** 
Disapproves to work in the cash economy 
     1 = highly unlikely     5 = highly likely 
 0.10  (0.25)   0.04  (0.11) 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 8:  Logistic Regression Results (Last category is indicator). People engaged in 
shadow economy activities                     Part 2 
 
Independent Variables  Estimated coefficients  
b value (Wald test) 






Personal income per thousand AUS$  .03  (9.33)**  -0.01  (9.43)** 
Age  .03  (6.10)*  -0.01  (0.15) 
Education 
1.  No schooling 
2.  Primary school 
3.  Intermediate, year 10 
4.  Leaving, year 12 
5.  Trade Nursing Diploma 
6.  Diploma Course 
7.  Uni, Tertiary 
6.63 
 6.22  (0.02) 
 7.19  (0.08) 
 1.19  (2.10) 
 0.36  (0.23) 
 0.28  (0.13) 
 0.03  (0.01) 
-0.12  (0.03) 
7.40 
 3.85  (0.30) 
 0.27  (0.13) 
 0.73  (2.98) 
0.34  (0.80) 
 0.24  (0.40) 
-0.15  (0.17) 
-0.03  (0.01) 
Occupation 
1.  Managers 
2.  Professionals 
3.  Ass.Professionals 
4.  Trade Clerical 
5.  Interm. Trade Clerical 
6.  Interm. Production, Transport 
7.  Elem. Clerical 
9.09 
 0.13  (0.01) 
-0.07  (0.01) 
 0.06  (0.01) 
-1.01  (2.02) 
-0.36  (0.24) 
-0.22  (0.07) 
-0.95  (1.43) 
8.79 
-0.58  (0.89) 
-0.81  (1.82) 
-0.65  (1.19) 
-0.79  (1.75) 
-0.40  (0.44) 
-0.05  (0.01) 
 0.92  (1.00) 
Gender (Male)  -0.80  (6.26)*   0.44  (4.95)* 
Marital Status 
1.  Never married 
2.  Now married, de facto 
3.  Widowed 
0.80 
 0.43  (0.44) 
 0.09  (0.03) 
 6.26  (0.06) 
11.64** 
 0.42  (0.75) 
-0.62  (2.82)* 
-0.52  (0.70) 
For whom are you working 
1.  Private company 
2.  University, Government 
5.72* 
 0.53  (1.98) 
 1.05  (5.70)* 
6.39* 
 0.63  (6.13)* 
 0.53  (4.15)* 
How many children do you have living with 
you at home 
1.  None 
2.  One 
3.  Two 
4.  Three 
1.79 
-0.32  (0.13) 
-0.23  (0.06) 
-0.09  (0.01) 
 0.41  (0.16) 
1.90 
-0.77  (1.30) 
-0.70  (1.04) 
-0.84  (1.52) 
-0.91  (1.64) 
Child support   -0.05  (0.01)  0.66  (1.27) 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01. 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Results            Part 3 
 
Classification Table for Shadow Economy Supply Activities 
 
Predicted 
Supply economy activity 
 
 
Observed  Yes  No 
Percentage 
Correct 
Shadow. ec.       Yes 







Overall Percentage      94.1 
 
Nagelkerke R = .289 






Classification Table for Shadow Economy Demand Activities 
 
Predicted 
Demand economy activity 
 
 
Observed  Yes  No 
Percentage 
Correct 
Shadow ec.          
Yes 







Overall Percentage      85.3 
 
Nagelkerke R = .229 
Chi-square = 175.78** 
 
Logit Regression - Dependent variables: 
1)  People working in the shadow economy (suppliers) = 0 
People not working in the shadow economy (suppliers)  = 1 
2)  People demanding shadow economy activities (demand) = 0 
People not demanding shadow economy activities (demand) = 1 
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Table 9:   Regression (OLS) result for Cash Income from Shadow Economy Supply. 
 
Independent Variables   b value  beta value  t value 
       
Official income  63.971  .260  2.52* 
Sex  -459.315  -.052  -0.53 
Age  29.728  .093  0.86 
Marital status  18.351  .003  0.03 
How many children  650.815  .176  1.83 
Education  -338.298  -.114  -1.13 
Child support  3145.500  .148  1.71 
I should honestly declare cash earnings  747.883  .128  1.19 
Others  should honestly declare cash 
earnings 
176.150  .022  0.23 
High tax leads to loss of income  486.221  .105  1.01 
Occupation  -19.386  -.008  -0.08 
Jobs for shadow economy activities  52.329  .030  0.33 
Work status  95.255  .019  0.19 
Are you paid fairly  -209.149  -.056  -0.60 
Choose an honest accountant  -2159.541  -.382  -4.30** 
 
Adjusted R
2  = .18. F = 2.69**. 
 
1 The b and beta coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression model (enter 
procedure). Dependent variable: Cash income from Shadow Economy Supply - Total 
Sample (118 = Shad. Ec. Suppliers; Non-shad. Suppliers = 1822). 
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Table 10:   Regression result for money spent for Shadow Economy Demand. 
 
Independent Variables   b value  beta value  t value 
       
Official income  74.130  .240  3.43** 
Sex  862.452  .042  0.89 
Age  25.007  .033  0.47 
Marital status  -277.984  -.017  -0.26 
How many children  1038.653  .118  1.89 
Education  -627.267  -.102  -1.56 
Child support  -1150.489  -.019  -0.31 
I should honestly declare cash earnings  -304.158  -.023  -0.36 
Others should honestly declare cash 
earnings 
51.848  .003  0.05 
High tax leads to loss of income  1739.676  .160  2.68** 
Occupation  -88.982  -.013  -0.21 
Jobs for shadow economy activities  -216.595  -.041  -0.71 
Work status  689.695  .059  0.88 
Are you paid fairly  240.432  .026  0.42 
Choose an honest accountant  -2130.900  -.131  -2.15* 
 
Adjusted R
2  = .08. F = 2.70**. 
 
1The b and beta coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression model (enter 
procedure). Dependent variable: Cash Economy Demand (283 persons who demand, 
1757 who do not-demand). 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 11: Some basic calculations of an aggregate figure of the shadow economy in Australia for the year 2000. 
                                    Part 1 
 
  Q’naire Sample   




































Managers and Administrators  7  185  0.04  1,267.14  643.50  815,404.59   
Professionals  18  363  0.05  1,535.00  1,646.20  2,526,917.00   
Ass. Professionals  10  206  0.05  3,670.00  1,037.90  3,809,093.00   
Trade, Clerical  24  217  0.11  3,478.13  1,588.00  5,523,270.44   
Interm. Trade, Clerical  12  278  0.04  1,360.00  1,599.90  2,175,864.00   
Interm. Production Transport  4  123  0.03  1,937.50  776.70  1,504,856.25   
Elem. Clerical  8  108  0.07  931.25  911.20  848,555.00   
Labourers  4  94  0.04  424.75  846.10  359,380.98   
               
Total     
 
14,603.77  9,049.50  17,563,341.26  2.86% 
Average        1,825.47       
 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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Table 11: Some basic calculations of an aggregate figure of the shadow economy in Australia for the year 2000. 












































  5,625,700.00  2,135.31  4,270.62  6,405.93  12,012,613,000.00  24,025,227,000.00  36,037,840,000.00 
Shad. Ec. Y of 
the workers 









Total Shad. Ec. 
Y 






               
               
               
          Shad.Ec.Y in % of 
GNI 
Shad.Ec.Y in % of 
GNI 
Shad.Ec.Y in % of 
GNI 
               
          4.81%  6.77%  8.73% 
1) Value from table 1 was taken, because it represents a bigger sample of shadow economy supplies (101 versus 87 from 
table 11 part 1). 4/4/01 12:48 Shadow_Australia 4 1.doc 
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